in many years of hard work here in North America, changing the curricula of many of our law schools and the self-image of many of our lawyers-is a man whose mind is elsewhere. For him, none of the rich North Atlantic democracies are home. Rather, they are places where he has gathered some lessons, warnings, and encouragements.
Whitman prefaced Leaves of Grass with a comparison between the closed-down character of Europe and the openness of the Ameri can future:
Let the age and wars of other nations be chanted, and their eras and characters be illustrated, and that finish the verse. Not so the great psalm of the republic. Here the theme is creative, and has vista.
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In Democratic Vistas he urges that psalm has barely begun: Far, far, indeed, stretch, in distance, our Vistas! How much is still to be disentangled, freed! How long it takes to make this American world see that it is, in itself, the final authority and reliance!
4
As his book goes along, Whitman continually looks from the gloriously possible to the sickeningly actual-from the American future to the facts of the Gilded Age-and back again. His naive hope invariably prevails over his sophisticated disgust. Compare Unger on Brazil in 1985: Indefinition was the common denominator of all these features of the life of the state .... All this indefinition could be taken as both the voice of transformative opportunity and the sign of a paralyzing confu sion. At one moment it seemed that new experiments in human associa tion might be staged here; at the next, that nothing could come out of this disheartening and preposterous blend of structure, shiftlessness, and stagnation.
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Again, At this time in world history, an attitude once confined to great visionar ies had become common among decent men and women. They could no longer participate in political struggle out of a simple mixture of per sonal ambition and devotion to the power and glory of the state. They also had to feel that they were sharing in an exemplary experiment in the remaking of society. A person who entered Brazilian politics in this spirit wanted his country to do more than rise to wealth and power as a variant of the societies and polities of the developed west. He wished it to become a testing ground for ... the options available to mankind.
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To get in the right mood to read passages like these, we rich, fat, tired North Americans must hark back to the time when our own democracy was newer and leaner-when Pittsburgh was as new, prom-ising, and problematic as Sao Paulo is now. Irving Howe describes "the American newness" of one hundred and fifty years ago as a time when "people start to feel socially invigorated and come to think they can act to determine their fate. "
7 He continues bleakly: "What is it like to live at such a time? The opposite of what it is like to live today. " 8 Howe's bleakness, which I and many of my contemporaries share, comes from the fear that what Unger calls "the cycles of reform and reaction" that make up politics in the United States are simply not up to the demands of the times. This bleakness is increased by our inabil ity to imagine any better goal than the next cycle of reform. On the one hand, we recognize that, for example, "Automation is progressin § much more rapidly than the decretinization of American senators." On the other hand, we see these cycles of reform and reaction as the operation of free institutions-institutions it took two hundred years of hard work, and lots of good luck, to construct. These institutions, increasingly rackety and ineffectual as they are, seem to be all we have got, and all we can really imagine having. So we content ourselves with saying that, as institutions go, ours are a lot better than the actually existing competition. Unger has us dead to rights when he speaks of "the rich, polished, critical and self-critical but also downbeat and Alexandrian culture of social and historical thought that now flourishes in the North American democracies."10 Our high culture, at the end of the twentieth century, resembles the culture that Whitman saw at the end of the nineteenth when he looked toward Europe.
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In Politics, Unger is reacting against this bleak defensiveness and resignation. He sometimes thinks of the tragic liberalism of us Alexan drians as an inexplicable failure of imagination, and sometimes as an exasperating weakness of will. What makes him different from most theorists who are critical of American liberalism is his orientation to ward the future rather than the past-his hopefulness. Most radical critics of American institutions (for example, the admirers of Althus serian, Heideggerian, or Foucauldian social thought-the people for whom Harold Bloom has invented the sobriquet "The School of Re-sentment"
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) would not be caught dead with an expression of hopeful ness on their faces. Their reaction to American inertia and impotence is rage, contempt, and the use of what they call "subversive, opposi tional discourse," rather than suggestions about how we might do things differently. Whereas people like Howe and myself would love to get some good ideas about what the country might do (and dream of the election of, if not another Lincoln, at least another FDR), the School of Resentment washes its hands of the American experiment. Since these people have also been disappointed, successively, in Rus sia, Cuba, and China, they now tend to wash their hands of all "struc tures and discourses of power" ( the Foucauldian term for what we used to call "institutions").
By contrast, when Unger is not berating us for our lack of hope and failure of nerve, he is sketching alternative institutions-a rotating capi tal fund, a government department of destabilization, and so on. He predicts, accurately, that the people who still take Marxism as a model of what a social theory should look like will reject his suggestions as reform ist tinkering, as inadequately oppositional. With equal accuracy, he predicts that we downbeat, Alexandrian, social democratic liberals will view them as utopian. Still, the distance between the Unger of Politics (as opposed to the Unger of a dozen years back, the author of Knowl edge and Politics
13
) and us Alexandrians is a lot less than that between Unger and the School of Resentment. For our reaction is, more accu rately: "Utopian, but, God knows, worth trying; still, you'll never get it into a Democratic, much less a Republican, platform." This is where Brazil comes in. If Unger were your ordinary univer salizing social theorist-as he sometimes, alas, makes himself out to be-names of particular countries would not be relevant. But he is rather (as the caption of an early, nasty review of Politics put it) "a preposterous political romantic"
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-as preposterous as Whitman, albeit better read. Being a political romantic is not easy these days. Presum ably it helps a lot to come from a big, backward country with lots of raw materials and a good deal of capital accumulation-a country that has started to lurch forward, even though frequently falling over its own feet. It must also help, ironically enough, to come from a country that cannot hope to achieve what the North Atlantic has achieved in the way of equality and decency by the same means: reliance on a free market in capital and on compromises between pressure groups. As Unger says, "For many third world countries the route of empowered democracy (that is, something like Unger's own alternative institutions] may repre sent less the bolder alternative to social democracy than the sole practi cal means by which even social-democratic goals can be achieved. "
15

Unger writes that
Much in this work can be understood as the consequence of an attempt to enlist the intellectual resources of the North Atlantic world in the service of concerns and commitments more keenly felt elsewhere. In this way I hope to contribute toward the development of an alternative to the vague, unconvinced, and unconvincing Marxism that now serves the advocates of the radical project as their lingua franca. If, however, the arguments of this book stand up, the transformative focus of this theo retical effort has intellectual uses that transcend its immediate origins and motives.
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I am interpreting Politics in the light of the first two sentences of this passage. I have doubts, however, about the third sentence. As a pragma tist, I think philosophy is at its best when it is content to be "its own time apprehended in thought" and lets transcendence go.
17 As a Kuhnian, 18 I have doubts about whether argument plays much of a role in scientific or political Gestalt-switches. Arguments (whose premises must necessarily be phrased in familiar vocabularies) often just get in the way of attempts to create an unfamiliar political vocabulary, a new lingua franca for those trying to transform what they see around them. If Unger is able to supply future leaders of Third World social movements with a non Marxist and non-"behavioral science" lingua franca--one that will help them brush aside the conventional wisdoms offered by the KGB and the CIA-he will have done something so important as to dwarf argumenta tion. nothing but hypotheses, and that these hypotheses are of value only as they render men's minds more sensitive to the life about them. "
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Realizing that Unger is a Brazilian philosopher lets us Alexan drians convert our initial reaction to his book to something more like, "We hope to Heaven these imaginary institutions do sell in Brazil; if they should actually work there, maybe then we could sell them here. The Southern Hemisphere might conceivably, a generation hence, come to the rescue of the Northern." This amounts to saying that if there is hope, it lies in the Third World. But this is not to say, with Winston Smith, "If there is hope, it lies in the proles." 2° For the Third World is not an undifferentiated mass of immiserated men and women. It is a set of diverse nations, and if it is ever to have hope it will be for a diverse set of national futures.
The School of Resentment sometimes suggests, following Lukacs and Foucault, that the immiserated share a common "consciousness" which can be set over against all "discourses of power" or "ideologies. "
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This suggestion that there is something "deep down"-something ahis torical and international under what we powerful, discursive types have been inscribing on the bodies of the weak-makes this school feel justi fied in toying with anarchism, with the idea that everythin fi would be all right if we could just get "power" off everybody's backs. Members of this School will be shocked and indignant to find that Unger does not assume that the initial agents of transformation in the Third World will be workers and peasants. He thinks they will be petty-bourgeois func tionaries:
In countries with a strong statist tradition the lower rungs of the govern mental bureaucracy constitute the most likely agents for the develop ment of such floating resources. For example, in many Latin American nations whole sectors of the economy (e. g., agriculture) are closely supervised and coordinated by economic bureaucrats: public-credit offi cers and agronomists .... But the bureaucracies are typically mined by a multitude of more or less well-intentioned, confused, unheroic crypto leftists-middle-class, university-trained youth , filled with the vague left ist ideas afloat in the world. The ambiguities of established rules and policies and the failures of bureaucratic control can supply these people with excuses to deny a fragment of governmental protection to its usual beneficiaries and make it available to other people, in new proportions 24 If Unger's description of his hoped-for allies seems wry and self-mocking, it is. He would like to identify himself with the victimized masses. Who, two thousand years after Christ and a hundred years after Zola, would not? But in Poli tics, the romanticism of Knowledge and Politics is balanced by a calcu lation of current possibilities.
To ward the end of The Critical Legal Studies Movement, Unger admitted that there is a disparity between our intentions and the archaic social form that they assume: a joint endeavor undertaken by discontented, factious intellectuals in the high style of nineteenth-century bourgeois radical ism. For all who participate in such an undertaking, the disharmony between intent and presence must be a cause of rage. We neither sup press this rage nor allow it the last word, because we do not give the last word to the historical world we inhabit. village can construct a small elementary school, does not take kindly to romance. These people are modernists, maybe even postmodernists. They have celebrated all the eras and characters, and they like to finish their verses with a dying fall, for example:
While this America settles in the mold of its vulgarity, heavily thickening to empire And protest only a bubble in the molten mass, pops and sighs out, and the mass hardens, I sadly remember that the flower fades to make fruit, the fruit rots to make earth.
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When these people do social theory, they push aside the tradition of Locke, Jefferson, Mill, Dewey, and Habermas and turn to a tradi tion that began with Hegel and is continued in Heidegger's downbeat story of the destiny of the West. Hegel made bud-flower-and-fruit his archetypal dialectical triad. His idea of a social theory was a retrospec tive narrative, written by someone whose "shape of life had grown old."28 Such a scenario either ends with the present (as Hegel and Heidegger prudently ended theirs) or else forecasts ( as Marx and Mao did) a new kind of human being-someone on whose body "power" has inscribed nothing, someone who will burst the bounds of all the vocabularies used to describe the old, tattered palimpsests. Since the School of Resentment is, nowadays, mostly "post-Marxist," it tends to favor the former sort of scenario. So it relishes phrases like "late capitalism," "the end of the metaphysics of presence," "after Ausch witz," and "post-X (for any previous value of X)." Its members outdo each other in belatedness. They tend to accept some version of the story of the West as a long slide downhill from better days (the time of "organic community" or "the polis" or some such-a time before "structures of power" started scrawling all over us). They see no re deeming features in the present, except perhaps for their own helpless rage. When Heidegger describes the West as successively discrediting the notions of "the supersensory world, the Ideas, God, the moral law, the authority of reason, g rogress, the happiness of the greatest num ber, culture, civilization," 9 they nod in recognition. Ah yes, "the great est happiness of the greatest number"-at least we now see through that pathetic apology for the Panoptic State. If my criticism of this School seems harsh, it is because one is always harshest on what one most dreads resembling. We tragic liberals are ourselves easily seduced by the lines I quoted from Jeffers' "Shine, 
1941).
28 See G. HEGEL, supra note 17, at 13. Perishing Republic. " 30 We are continually tempted by the urge to sit back and grasp our time in thought rather than continuing to try to change it. Even though we can still manage two cheers for America even America under Reagan-a romantic like Unger sees little differ ence between us and the School of Resentment. For the only difference between us and the Resenters is that we regret our lack of imagination, whereas they make a virtue of what they think a philosophico-historical necessity.
Our only excuse is, once again, to appeal to national differences to say, in effect, "Maybe it's easier in Brazil, but it's pretty hard here." Political imagination is, almost always, national imagination. To imag ine great things is to imagine a great future for a particular community, a community one knows well, identifies with, can make plausible pre dictions about.
31 In the modern world, this usually means one's nation. Political romance is, therefore, for the foreseeable future, going to consist of psalms of national future rather than the future of "man kind." Officially, to be sure, we are all supposed to be "past" national ism, to be citizens of the human race. We are all supposed to believe, with the Marxists, that nationalism is just "mystification." But Cas toriadis gives this pretense the treatment it deserves:
To say: 'T he proof that nationalism was a simple mystification, and hence something unreal, lies in the fact that it will be dissolved on the day of world revolution,' is not only to sell the bearskin before we catch the bear, it is to say: 'You who have lived from 1900 to 1965 and to who knows when, and you, the millions who died in the two wars ... all of you, you are in-existent, you have always been in-existent with respect to true history .... True history was the invisible Potentiality that will be, and that, behind your back, was preparing the end of your illusions. '
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Castoriadis and Unger are willing to work with, rather than deconstruct, the notions that already mean something to people pres ently alive-while nonetheless not "giving the last word to the histori cal world they inhabit. "
33 That is another way in which both differ from the School of Resentment. The latter School is interested not in build ing with what we have, but in penetrating to the "repressed" reality behind the "ideological" appearances. political utopias later. Though members of this School accept in meta theory the Heidegger-Derrida view-that the reality-appearance dis tinction is the archetypal "binary opposition" from whose clutches we must escape-in their theoretical practice they wallow in it.
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Castoriadis and Unger escape this temptation because they adopt the attitude toward philosophy which I earlier quoted from Dewey. The "anti-naturalism" of Unger's book comes down to the least com mon denominator of Hegel, Marx, and Dewey: the claim that "the formative contexts of social life . . . or the procedural frameworks of problem solving and interest accommodation . . . [are] nothing but frozen politics: conflicts interrupted or contained" plus the desire "to deprive these frameworks or contexts of their aura of higher necessity or authority. "
35 This anti-naturalism fits together nicely with Cas toriadis' claim that "the imaginary-as the social imaginary and as the imagination of the psyche-is the logical and ontological condition of 'the real.' " 36 Just as in the individual psyche, moral character is "con flict interrupted or contained," so is the moral character of a society that is, its institutions.
Unger urges the "thesis that everything in our ideas about the world, including our conceptions of contingency, necessity, and possi bility, is sensitive to changes in our empirical beliefs. "
37 This holistic, Quinean thesis provides what he calls "the philosophical setting of an antinaturalistic social theory. "
38 "Setting" is the right word. It is not so much a "foundation" for such a theory as an excuse not to take philoso phy as seriously as the Marxists or the Resenters take it. That thesis helps one accept Unger's claim that "everything is politics"-that if politics can create a new form of social life, there will be time enough later for theorists to explain how this creation was possible and why it was a good thing. Quinean holism helps assure romantics that we humans are lords of possibility as well as actuality-for possibility is a function of a descriptive vocabulary � and that vocabulary is as much up for political grabs as anything else. the use of one vocabulary rather than another, as a "primordial institution," and says that "at this level identitary logic cannot seize hold of the institution, since the institution is neither necessary nor contingent, since its emergence is not determined but is that on the basis of which and by means of which alone something determined exists." C. CASTORIADIS, supra note 9, at 258 (emphasis in original).
This latter point-the least common denominator of Quine, Witt genstein, and Dewey-provides the backup for Castoriadis' claim that what matters in a social thinker is the bits to which argumentation is irrelevant:
What the greatest thinkers may have said that was truthful and fecund was always said despite what they thought of as being and as thinkable, not because of what they thought or in agreement with it. And, to be sure, it is in this despite that their greatness is expressed, now as ever.
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In other words, if there is social hope it lies in the imagination-in people describing a future in terms which the past did not use. "The only thing that is not defined by the imaginary in human needs," Castoriadis says, "is an approximate number of calories per day." We tragic liberals realize wistfully that back in the 1880s we too might have seen illimitable vistas. We might have been the young John Dewey rather than the aging Henry Adams. We might have read Carlyle without discouragement, Whitman without giggles, and Edward Bel lamy with a wild surmise. Nowadays, despite our fears, we still insist that it was lucky for the United States-not just for its poets and professors but also for its miners and sharecroppers-that our predecessors did read them that way. For in the intervening hundred years things actually got a lot fairer, more decent, more equal. People who had read those books had a lot to do with making them so. A century after Whitman's death it may seem that, as Orwell said, "the 'democratic vistas' have ended in barbed wire. "
43 But we covered a lot of ground before our century, and our hope, began to run out. Maybe the Brazilians ( or the Tanzanians, or somebody) will be able to dodge around that barbed wire-despite all that the superpowers can do to prevent them.
Unger's book offers a wild surmise, a set of concrete suggestions for risky social experiments, and a polemic against those who think the world has grown too old to be saved by such risk-taking. It does not offer a theory about Society, or Modernity, or Late Capitalism, or the Underlying Dynamics of anything. So, if Unger is going to have an audience, it may not be in the rich North Atlantic democracies. The intellectuals here may continue to find him "preposterous," because he does not satisfy what we have come to regard as legitimate expecta tions. He does not make moves in any game we know how to play. His natural audience may lie in the Third World-where his book may someday make possible a new national romance. Maybe someday it will help the literate (that is, the petty-bourgeois) citizens of some country to see vistas where before they saw only dangers-see a hith erto undreamt-of national future instead of seeing their country as condemned to play out the role that some foreign theorist has written for it.
One of the most helpful ways to think about such a possibility is given by Castoriadis' analogy between the individual psyche and the social whole:
There comes a time when the subject, not because he has discovered the primal scene or detected penis envy in his grandmother, but through his struggle in his actual life and as a result of repetition, unearths the central signifier of his neurosis and finally looks at it in its contingency, its poverty and its insignificance. In the same way, for people living today, the question is not to understand how the transition from the neolithic clans to the markedly divided cities of Akkad was made. It is to understand-and this obviously means, here more than anywhere else, to act-the contingency, the poverty and the insignificance of this 'signi fier' of historical societies, the division into masters and slaves, into dominators and dominated.
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From Castoriadis' angle, the efforts of nineteenth-century German philosophers (and of their ungrateful heirs, the contemporary School of Resentment) look like attempts to discover the primal scene, or to unmask grandmother's penis envy (and, more recently, grandfather's womb envy). The same doubts arise even about relatively unphilo sophical social theory-social theory that ignores local (and, in particu lar, national) differences in favor of "underlying dynamics." Given Castoriadis' analogy, it is hard to believe that patient study of Man, or of Society, or of Capitalism, will tell us whether the division into domi nators and dominated is "natural" or "artificial," or which, if any, contemporary societies are "ripe" for the elimination of this division, or what "factors" will determine whether or not this possibility will be realized. Such discussion seems as remote from the project of imagin ing a new national future as are hydraulic models of libidinal flow from what actually happens on the couch. Such models may help the analyst to make an incisive diagnostic remark, but they are of no help in predicting the wildly idiosyncratic and unpredictable incident in the "struggle of actual life" that suddenly permits that endlessly repeated remark to mean something to the patient. Nor do they help in predict ing the course of the analysis from that point onward.
Both Unger's slogan "everything is politics" and Castoriadis' anal ogy help us see why, insofar as social theory declines to be romantic, it is inevitably retrospective, and thus biased toward conservatism. As Hegel said, it typically tells us about the rise of a form of life that has now grown old-about possibilities which are, by now, largely ex hausted. It tells us about the structure of what, with luck, our descen dants will regard as our neurosis, without telling us much about what they will regard as "normal." It abstracts from national histories, which is like abstracting from the particular family in which a particular pa tient grew up. It tends to dismiss as "irrational" whatever purely local factors falsify its generalizations and predictions. This is just as unhelp ful as telling the patient that his resistance to the analyst is "irrational."
Liberal social theorists resist Unger's and Castoriadis' suggestion that release from domination, if and when it comes, will come not in the form of "rational development" but through something unforeseeable and passionate. Most of the twentieth century's political surprises, liber als rightly point out, have been unpleasant ones. Romanticism, after all, was common to Mussolini, Hitler, Lenin, and Mao--to all the leaders who summoned a nation to slough off its past in an act of passionate self renewal, and whose therapy proved far worse than the disease-as well as to Schiller, Shelley, Fichte, and Whitman. So it is tempting for us liberals to say that the slogan "everything is politics" is too dangerous to work with, to insist on a role for "reason" as opposed to "passion."
The problem we face in carrying through on this insistence is that "reason" usually means "working according to the rules of some famil iar language-game, some familiar way of describing the current situa tion." We liberals have to admit the force of Dewey's, Unger's, and Castoriadis' point that such familiar language-games are themselves nothing more than "frozen politics," that they serve to legitimate, and make seem inevitable, precisely the forms of social life (for example, the cycles of reform and reaction) from which we desperately hope to break free. So we have to find something else for "reason" to mean. This effort to reinterpret rationality is central to Habermas' work, and culminates in his distinction between "subject-centered reason" and "communicative reason"-roughly, the distinction between rationality as appeal to the conventions of a presently-played language-game and appeal to democratic consensus, to "argumentative procedures" rather than to "first principles. "
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But the idea of "argumentative procedures" for changing our de scription of what we are doing-for example, changing our political vocabularies from Mill's to Marx's, or from Althusser's to Unger's seems inapplicable to the way in which patients grasp the contingency, poverty and insignificance of the central signifiers of their neuroses. To say that the aim of social change should be a society in which such procedures are all that we need-in which passionate, romantic, only retrospectively arguable breaks with the past are no longer necessary is like saying that the aim of psychoanalysis should be "nonnal function ing." Of course it should, but that does not make psychoanalysis a less hit-or-miss, a more rational, procedure. Of course we should aim at such a society, but that does not mean that the only sort of social change we should work for is the kind for which we can offer good arguments. Unger has no more idea than do his readers whether his rotating capital fund will work-any more than Madison had of whether the separation of powers would work, or than an analyst has of whether a given remark will get through to a given patient. The only "argument" such people can give for such experiments is "Let's give it a try; nothing else seems to work."
This was, to be sure, also Hitler's and Mao's "argument." But we should not use this resemblance between Unger and Mao to make Unger look bad or Mao good. Rather, we should realize that the notion of "argumentative procedures" is not relevant to the situation in which nothing familiar works and in which people are desperately ( on the couch, on the barricades) looking for something, no matter how unfamiliar, which might work. What remains relevant is, roughly, free dom of speech. Whether a given romantic, once in power, allows such freedom (of newspapers, universities, public assemblies, electoral choices, and so on) is, though not an infallible index, the best index we have of whether he or she is likely to do his or her nation some good. To my mind, the cash-value of Habermas' philosophical notions of "communicative reason" and "intersubjectivity" consists in the famil iar political freedoms fashioned by the rich North Atlantic democracies during the last two centuries. Such notions are not "foundations" or "defenses" of the free institutions of those countries; they are those institutions, painted in the philosopher's traditional "gray on gray. " 46 We did not learn about the importance of these institutions as a coun terweight to the romantic imagination by thinking through the nature of Reason or Man or Society; we learned about this the hard way, by watching what happened when those institutions were set aside.
More generally, I doubt that any philosophical reworking of the notion of "rationality," or of any similar notion, is going to help us sort out the de Sades from the Whitmans, the Heideggers from the Cas toriadises,47 or the Hitlers from the Rosa Luxemburgs. "Everything is politics," in this context, means that what political history cannot teach, philosophy cannot teach either. The idea that theorizing, or philosophical reflection, will help us sort out good from bad romantics is part of the larger idea that philosophy can anticipate history by spotting "objectively progressive" or "objectively reactionary" intellec tual movements. This is as bad as Plato's idea (recently resurrected by Allan B1oom 48 ) that philosophers can distinguish "morally healthy" from "morally debilitating" kinds of music. We cannot hope to avoid A full reply to these pages of Habermas would require a separate paper. Here I can only remark that Castoriadis no more assimilates these two than the pscyhoanalyst assimilates the patient's day-to-day "struggle in his actual life" to the unconscious fantasies that dictate the terms in which the patient describes that struggle. It is one thing to say that the language we currently use for describing our individual or social situation is an imaginative product-one that may, with luck, be replaced by another such product-and another to say that recognizing this fact is incompatible with taking this language seriously. It is just not the case that such recognition "prejudices the validity of linguistic utterances generally," id. at 331, nor that on Castoriadis' view "social praxis disappears in the anonymous hurly-burly of the institutionalization of ever new worlds from the imaginary dimension. risky social experiments by discerning the presence or absence of dubi ous overtones (for example, "bourgeois ideology," "authoritarianism," "irrationalism," "the philosophy of subjectivity") in the discourse of those who advocate such experiments. In order to conclude on a concrete note, I shall discuss one such experiment. Suppose that somewhere, someday, the newly-elected gov ernment of a large industrialized country decreed that everybody would get the same income, regardless of occupation or disability. Simultaneously, it instituted vastly increased inheritance taxes and froze large bank transfers. Suppose that, after the initial turmoil, it worked: that is, suppose that the economy did not collapse, that peo ple still took pride in their work (as streetcleaners, pilots, doctors, canecutters, Cabinet ministers, or whatever), and so on. Suppose that the next generation in that country was brought up to realize that, whatever else they might work for, it made no sense to work for wealth. But they worked anyway (for, among other things, national glory). That country would become an irresistible example for a lot of other countries, "capitalist," "Marxist," and in-between. The elector ates of these countries would not take time to ask what "factors" had made the success of this experiment possible. Social theorists would not be allowed time to explain how something had happened that they had pooh-poohed as utopian, nor to bring this new sort of society under familiar categories. All the attention would be focused on the actual details of how things were working in the pioneering nation. Sooner or later, the world would be changed.
Castoriadis, like Edward Bellamy a hundred years ago, advocates such an experiment, but he sensibly declines to offer an argument for it:
If ... I have maintained for twenty-five years that an autonomous soci ety ought immediately to adopt, in the area of "requittal", an absolute equality of all wages, salaries, incomes, etc., this springs neither from some idea about any natural or other "identity/equality" of men, nor from theoretical reasoning ... this is a matter of the imaginary significa tions which hold society together and of the paideia of individuals.
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The success of such an experiment would be the analogue of a patient getting better as a result of coming to see, "in his actual life and as a result of repetition," the "contingency, poverty and insignificance" of "the central signifier of his neurosis." The French had heard incisive diagnoses many times, but one summer morning in 1789 they woke up conscious of the contingency, poverty, and insignificance of the three Estates, the lilies of Bourbon, and the Catholic Church-of the imagi- nary significations that had been holding their social life together, had been essential to the meaning of "France." Things in France did not work out very well at first, but the world was, eventually, changed for the better. European national neuroses began to have different sorts of central signifiers.
A large part of the irrelevance to the Third World of the Cold War, and of talk about "capitalism" and "socialism," is that the obsta cles to equalization of income, and to a paideia that is not centered around the attainment of wealth, are pretty well the same in the United States and in Russia.
50 More broadly, the imaginary significations that hold society together are pretty much the same in both places. No single change could do more to expose the contingency, poverty, and insignificance of some of the central signifiers of the national neuroses of both superpowers than some third country's success at equalizing incomes. To say, as I have been saying here, that if there is hope it lies in the imagination of the Third World, is to say that the best any of us here in Alexandria can hope for is that somebody out there will do something to tear up the present system of imaginary significations within which politics in (and between) the First and Second Worlds is conducted. It need not be equalization of incomes, but it has to be something like that-something so preposterously romantic as to be no longer discussed by us Alexandrians. Only some actual event, the actual success of some political move made in some actual country, is likely to help. No hopeful book by Unger or Habermas, 51 any more than one more hopeless, "oppositional," unmasking book by the latest Resenter, is going to do the trick. Unger, however, has an advantage over the rest of us. His advantage is not that he has a "more powerful theory," but simply that he is aware of "the exemplary instability of the Third World" 52 in a way that most of us are not. His theoretical writing is shot through with a romanticism for which we Alexandrians no longer have the strength. His book has a better chance than most to be linked, in the history books, with some such world-transforming event. 
